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Some Leavers claim the referendum result was not primarily about immigration, but anxiety about Britain’s
perceived loss of sovereignty to the EU. In their new book, Harold D. Clarke, Matthew
Goodwin (left) and Paul Whiteley draw on data about more than 150,000 voters to analyse
the factors and concerns that led people to vote Leave. The mix of calculations, emotions and
cues were complex, but immigration – and the personal appeal of Nigel Farage and Boris
Johnson to different groups of voters – were key.
Britain is approaching the one-year anniversary of the vote for Brexit. Yet the question of why
a majority of people voted to leave the European Union (EU) remains contested. Since nearly
52 per cent of the country opted for Brexit, some have argued that the vote was motivated mainly by concerns over
national sovereignty, while others have pointed to an economically ‘left behind’ group of voters, or to intense
concerns over immigration. In a new book published this month we contribute to this debate.
The book, Brexit: Why Britain Voted to Leave the EU, draws on twelve years’ worth of data from representative
national surveys, conducted each month from April 2004 until June 2016. They probed the backgrounds and
concerns of more than 150,000 voters and in June 2016 included a panel design, whereby voters were contacted a
few days before the vote and right after. These data provide unprecedented insight into the Brexit vote.
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Our starting point is an established literature on what shapes public attitudes toward the EU, which stresses the
importance of calculations about perceived costs and benefits of being in the EU, the role of risk, emotion, leaders,
and public concerns over domestic and ‘identity-related’ issues, such immigration. In short, our argument is that
Brexit was not driven by ‘one factor’. The vote to leave the EU reflected what we refer to as a complex and cross-
cutting mix of calculations, emotions and cues. Within this, immigration was key.
By tracking public attitudes toward EU membership over the long-term, we show how the ‘fundamentals’ of the
Brexit vote did not suddenly appear in 2016 but were ‘baked in’ long ago. By examining what shaped volatility in
these attitudes since 2004, we show how people’s views of the EU were strongly shaped by their assessments of
how the main parties had performed on key ‘valence’ issues, but mainly immigration and the economy. If people felt
anxious over migration, ‘left behind’ economically, and worried about the control of Brussels, they were significantly
more likely to oppose EU membership long before David Cameron even called the referendum.
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Then, as Britain trundled toward the 2016 referendum people began to assess the costs and benefits of EU
membership. Crucially, a plurality accepted that Brexit would harm the economy, and probably their own finances as
well. But most voters also felt that remaining in the EU would increase the risk of terrorism, harm Britain’s cultural
life and erode sovereignty, while leaving the EU would mean less immigration. Identity concerns were already
trumping economic self-interest. It is likely that Angela Merkel’s decision only a few months before the vote to allow
large numbers of refugees into the EU sharpened this concern and entrenched a view that politicians (and the EU)
were not in control of an issue that a large section of the electorate cared deeply about. For reasons that we set out
in the book, Cameron’s renegotiation with the EU failed to quell these concerns.
It is worth underlining the point that people accepted Brexit was a risk, a belief Cameron and Remainers sought to
amplify through their elite-focused campaign. They recognised that many voters were risk averse and carpet-
bombed them with dire warnings and prophecies. When asked ahead of the vote to indicate how risky they thought
leaving would be (on a scale of 0-10 where ‘0’ is ‘no risk’ and ‘10’ is ‘very risky’), 54 percent of voters assigned
scores of six of greater. Playing on this notion of risk was not necessarily a ‘bad’ strategy –believing Brexit was risky
was the strongest predictor of whether or not somebody voted to Remain.
But on its own the risk-based strategy was not enough, especially when set alongside the powerful and emotionally
resonant case over immigration. Our findings reveal how perceptions of risk were not distributed evenly, which
meant Remain were unable to cut through to key groups who would go on to vote for Brexit in large numbers. Our
statistical analysis reveals people who felt negatively toward immigration, worried about a loss of control to Brussels,
and had been left behind economically were much more likely to minimise the risk of Brexit. These voters felt they
had nothing to lose, or were determined to force their identity concerns onto the agenda regardless.
By examining emotions, too, our book points to another problem for Remainers, who spent too much time trying to
amplify the problems of Brexit at the expense of making the positive case for EU membership. After worries about
the risks of Brexit, the second strongest predictor of the Remain vote were positive feelings about the EU –a driver
that was not maximised by Remainers. Might things have been different if Cameron, George Osborne and Barack
Obama had consistently made the positive case for Europe?
On June 23 2016 all of these dynamics came together to deliver the vote for Brexit—a choice that reflected a
complex mix of calculations, emotions and cues. Immigration was key to the vote for Brexit and ran through this
decision. Not only were those who felt negatively about immigration more likely to minimise the risks of Brexit but
they were also significantly more likely to turnout, and then vote for Brexit in the polling booth. Immigration exerted
powerful direct and indirect effects on the vote. The idea that this issue, which gave Leavers an emotional appeal
that Remain’s economic pessimism could not match, was not central is misleading. Indeed, weeks before the
balloting we argued that Leavers were more likely to show up at the polls because of this ‘enthusiasm gap’ –and
they did.
Though Leavers were divided on how to deal with immigration, our findings also point to the important role of ‘cues’
from leaders, specifically Boris Johnson and Nigel Farage. Johnson had a particularly important effect –if you liked
Boris then even after controlling for a host of other factors you were significantly more likely to vote for Brexit.
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Farage was less popular among the professional middle-classes but he was more popular among blue-collar
workers and left behind voters, underlining how these rival messengers were able to reach into different groups of
voters. When, from June 1 2016, the rival Leave camps all put the pedal down on immigration they were firmly in
tune with the core driver of their vote. Neither Cameron nor Corbyn were nearly as effective for Remain. Leader
cues were much stronger on the Leave side.
In conclusion, the story of why Britain voted for Brexit is straightforward. Propagated by an unlikely pair of
messengers, Leave’s ‘Take Back Control’ message harnessed the emotive power of immigration, amplifying public
concerns over identity and a feeling of being left behind that had been baked in long before the vote was called.
These immigration fears, hitherto confined to the politically incorrect margins, not abstract concerns about a
‘democratic deficit’ or rescuing UK sovereignty from Brussels bureaucrats, do much to explain why Britain voted for
Brexit.
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